Antitrust in Innovative Industries by Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We  thank  Shane  Greenstein,  Ken  Hendricks,  Volker  Nocke,  Richard  Schmalensee,  Scott  Stern,  and
participants in seminars at the FTC, Harvard, Northwestern, Penn, UT-Austin, the 2003 NBER Summer
Institute meeting on Innovation Policy, the 2003 International Industrial Organization Conference, and the
2004 Duke-Northwestern-Texas IO Theory Conference for helpful discussions and comments.  We also thank
the NSF (SES-0318438) and the Searle Foundation for financial support.  The views expressed herein are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Ilya Segal and Michael Whinston.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.  Antitrust in Innovative Industries
Ilya Segal and Michael Whinston
NBER Working Paper No. 11525
July  2005
JEL No. L40, O31
ABSTRACT
We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. A more protective
antitrust policy may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new
entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect
can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply holding the innovation rate
fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We show that in some
cases, holding the innovation rate fixed, as suggested by our comparative statics results, the tension
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This paper is concerned with the eﬀects of antitrust policy in markets in which innovation
is important. Traditionally, antitrust analyses have largely ignored issues of innovation,
focusing instead on the price/output eﬀects of contested practices.1 Yet, over the last
two decades, intellectual property and innovation have become central to competition
in a large share of the economy. In the wake of these changes, and sparked by the
recent Microsoft case, a number of commentators have expressed concerns that traditional
antitrust analysis might be poorly suited to maximizing welfare in such industries. As
Evans and Schmalensee [2002] put it, in these industries
“...ﬁrms engage in dynamic competition for the market – usually through
research-and development (R&D) to develop the ‘killer’ product, service, or
feature that will confer market leadership and thus diminish or eliminate
actual or potential rivals. Static price/output competition on the margin in
the market is less important.”
The eﬀects of antitrust policy on innovation are poorly understood. In the Microsoft
case, for example, the most signiﬁcant issue arising from Microsoft’s allegedly exclusion-
ary practices was almost surely their eﬀect on innovation. Microsoft argued that while a
technological leader like Microsoft may possess a good deal of static market power, this
is merely the fuel for stimulating dynamic R&D competition, a process that it argued
works well in the software industry. Antitrust intervention in this process would run the
risk of reducing the rate of innovation and welfare. The government, in contrast, argued
that Microsoft’s practices prevented entry of new ﬁrms and products, and therefore would
both raise prices and retard innovation.2 How to reconcile these two views, however, was
never clear in the discussion surrounding the case.
On closer inspection, these two conﬂicting views reveal a fundamental tension in the
eﬀects of antitrust policy on innovation. Policies that protect new entrants from incum-
bents raise a successful innovator’s initial proﬁts and may thereby encourage innovation,
as the government argued. But new entants hope to become the next Microsoft, and will
1Issues of innovation have been considered when discussing “innovation markets” in some horizontal
merger cases in which there was a concern that a merger might reduce R&D competition. See, e.g.,
Gilbert and Sunshine [1995].
2For further discussion, see e.g., Evans and Schmalensee [2002], Fisher and Rubinfeld [2000], Gilbert
and Katz [2001], and Whinston [2001].
1want to engage in the same sorts of entry-disadvantaging behaviors should they succeed.
Thus, by lowering the proﬁts of incumbency, protective policies may actually retard in-
novation, as Microsoft alleged. Disentangling these two eﬀects is the central focus of this
paper.
We study the eﬀects of antitrust policy in innovative industries using models in which
innovation is a continual process, with new innovators replacing current incumbents, and
holding dominant market positions until they are themselves replaced. Although a great
deal of formal modeling of R&D races has occurred in the industrial organization litera-
ture (beginning with the work of Loury [1979] and Lee and Wilde [1980]; see Reinganum
[1989] for a survey), this work has typically analyzed a single, or at most a ﬁnite sequence,
of innovative races.3 Instead, our models are closer to those that have received atten-
tion in the recent literature on growth (e.g., Grossman and Helpman [1991], Aghion and
Howitt [1992], Aghion et. al [2001]). The primary distinction between our analysis and
the analysis in this growth literature lies in our explicit focus on how antitrust policies
aﬀect equilibrium in such industries.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we introduce and analyze
a simple stylized model of antitrust in an innovative industry. Our aim is to develop a
model that yields some general insights into the eﬀect of antitrust policies on the rate
of innovation, and that we can apply to a number of diﬀerent antitrust policies in the
remainder of the paper. In Section 2, we study the simplest version of this stylized
model, in which in each period a single potential entrant conducts R&D. The model
captures antitrust policy in a reduced form way, by assuming that it alters the proﬁt
ﬂo w st h a ta ni n c u m b e n ta n dan e we n t r a n tc a ne a r ni nc o m p e t i t i o nw i t he a c ho t h e r ,
as well as the proﬁts of an uncontested incumbent. In the model, a more protective
antitrust policy – one that protects entrants at the expense of incumbents – increases
a new entrant’s proﬁts, but also aﬀects the proﬁtability of continuing incumbents. Since
3Three exceptions are O’Donohue et al. [1998] and Hunt [2004], who use continuing innovation models
to examine optimal patent, and Fudenberg and Tirole [2000] who study dynamic limit pricing in markets
with network externalities using a model of continuing innovation.
4The growth literature often considers how changes in various parameters will aﬀect the rate of
innovation, sometimes even calling such parameters measures of the degree of “antitrust policy” (e.g.,
Aghion et al. [2001] refer to the elasticity of substitution as such a measure). Here we are much more
explicit than is the growth literature about what antitrust policies toward speciﬁc practices do. This
is not a minor diﬀerence, as our results diﬀer substantially from those that might be inferred from the
parameter changes considered in the growth literature. As one example, one would get exactly the
wrong conclusion if one extrapolated results showing that more inelastic demand functions lead to more
R&D (e.g., Aghion and Howitt [1992]) to mean that allowing an incumbent to enhance its market power
through long-term contracts leads to more R&D.
2successful entrants become continuing incumbents, both of these eﬀects matter for the
incentive to innovate.
Using this simple stylized model, we develop some general insights into the eﬀect of
antitrust policies on the rate of innovation. We do so by characterizing equilibrium in
terms of “innovation beneﬁt” and “innovation supply” functions, which provides a very
simple approach to comparative statics. This approach to comparative statics tells us
that a policy change will increase innovation when a certain weighted sum of the proﬁt
changes for a new entrant and a continuing incumbent increase, holding ﬁxed the level
of innovation. This weighted sum corresponds to the change in the present discounted
value of successful entry, which we call the “innovation prize,” holding ﬁxed the rate of
innovation. Using this condition, we show that a more protective antitrust policy “front-
loads” an innovative new entrant’s proﬁt stream, and that this feature tends to increase
the level of innovative activity. We also note here how the degree of market growth can
alter the eﬀects of antitrust policy.
In Section 3, we extend our comparative statics approach to substantially more general
innovation beneﬁt and supply settings. The extension to innovation supply, for example,
allows us to consider supply settings with constant returns to scale R&D technologies,
with N potential entrants, with free entry, or with “free entry with a limited idea” as
in work by Fudenberg and Tirole [2000] and O’Donohue et al. [1998]. We show using
our innovation beneﬁt and supply approach that in each case, or in any other setting
satisfying several basic properties, the condition characterizing comparative statics is the
same.
With the comparative statics results of Section 3 in hand, in Sections 4 and 5 we
develop applications to speciﬁc antitrust policies. In Section 4, we focus on incumbent
behaviors designed to reduce the level of entrant R&D. We begin with a surprising obser-
vation: in many circumstances involving R&D-deterring activities, the apparent tension
between eﬀects on entrant and continuing incumbent proﬁts does not arise at all.I nt h e s e
cases, holding the rate of innovation ﬁxed, limits on R&D deterring activities raise the
proﬁts of both new entrants and incumbents, and so our characterization result tells us
that the rate of innovation necessarily increases. We then analyze two models of antitrust
policies toward speciﬁc R&D deterring activities. First, we study a model of long-term
(exclusive) contracts and show that a more protective antitrust policy necessarily stimu-
lates innovation, and also raises both aggregate and consumer welfare. This model falls
into the class of cases in which the tension indeed does not arise. Then, we consider a
model of compatibility choice in an industry characterized by network externalities. Here
3we identify cases in which innovation necessarily increases when incumbents are forced
to make their products more compatible with those of future entrants (which, again,
are cases in which the tension does not arise), as well as cases in which innovation may
decline. (Appendix C also contains an extension of our long-term contracting model to
the case of uncertain innovation size when there is a cost of rapidly implementing new
innovations. The key new feature in this model is that antitrust policy has a “selec-
tion eﬀect,” altering the set of innovations that enter the market. We show that in this
situation, limitations on long-term contracting may retard innovation.)
The framework that we develop is not limited to exclusionary behaviors. In Sec-
tion 5, we consider the eﬀects of voluntary deals, looking speciﬁcally at (nonexclusive)
licensing by incumbents of entrants’ innovations and at price collusion. We show using
our comparative statics results that restrictions on these behaviors necessarily lower the
rate of innovation. Moreover, restrictions on licensing necessarily lower welfare, while
restrictions on collusion may either raise or lower welfare depending on whether innova-
tion is initially socially excessive or insuﬃcient (standard deadweight loss distortions are
assumed away in this model).
The analysis of Sections 2-5 makes the strong assumption that only potential entrants
do R&D. While useful for gaining understanding, this assumption is rarely descriptive
of reality. In Section 6, we turn our attention to models in which both incumbents and
potential entrants conduct R&D. Introducing incumbent investment has the potential to
substantially complicate our analysis by making equilibrium behavior depend on the level
of the incumbent’s lead over other ﬁr m s .W es t u d yt w om o d e l si nw h i c hw ec a na v o i dt h i s
state dependence. In one model, we assume that the previous leading technology enters
the public domain whenever the incumbent innovates. In this model, the incumbent
does R&D solely to avoid displacement by a rival. In our second model, we assume
that the proﬁt improvement from a larger lead is linear in the size of the lead and that
potential entrants win all “ties,” which again leads the incumbent’s optimal R&D level
to be stationary. In this model, the incumbent does R&D to improve its proﬁt ﬂows until
the time that it is displaced by a rival. Interestingly, in both models there are a wide
range of circumstances in which a more protective policy can increase the innovation
incentives of both the incumbent and potential entrants.
In the policies considered in Sections 2-6 antitrust policy aﬀects entrant and incum-
bent proﬁt ﬂows, which shift only the innovation beneﬁt. In Section 7, we consider
antitrust policies that have other eﬀects. We ﬁrst consider predatory activities, which
alter an entrant’s probability of survival. As when policy aﬀects proﬁt ﬂows, limitations
4on predatory activities aﬀect only innovation beneﬁt. We then consider policies that
instead involve shifts in innovation supply. These include limitations on behaviors that
raise rivals’ R&D costs, such as buying up needed R&D inputs or engaging in costly
litigation to challenge entrants’ patents.
Section 8 concludes and brieﬂy discusses the relation of our analysis to issues in
intellectual property protection, where some similar issues arise.
2. A Stylized Model of Antitrust in Innovative Industries
We begin by developing a stylized model of continuing innovation. Our aim is to develop
a model that yields some general insights into the eﬀect of antitrust policies on the rate
of innovation, and that we can apply to a number of diﬀerent antitrust policies in the
remainder of the paper. In this section, we develop the simplest possible version of this
model, which we substantially generalize in the next section.
The model has discrete time and an inﬁnite horizon. There are two ﬁrms who discount
future proﬁts at rate δ ∈ (0,1). In each period, one of the ﬁrms is the “incumbent” I
and the other is the “potential entrant” E. In the beginning of each period, the potential
entrant chooses its R&D rate, φ ∈ [0,1]; the cost of R&D is given by a strictly convex
function c(φ).5 The R&D of the potential entrant yields an innovation – which we inter-
pret to be a particular improvement in the quality of the product – with probability φ.
If the potential entrant innovates, it receives a patent, enters, competes with the incum-
bent in the present period, and then becomes the incumbent in the next period, while
the previous incumbent then becomes the potential entrant. In this sense, this is a model
of “winner-take-all” competition. While the patent provides perfect protection (forever)
to the innovation itself, the other ﬁrm may overtake the patent holder by developing
subsequent innovations.
Antitrust policies can impact incentives for innovation in various ways. Through
most of the paper we will be interested in the eﬀects of an antitrust policy α that aﬀects
the incumbent’s competition with an entrant who has just received a patent. Many
antitrust policies are of this type and we will analyze some of these in detail in Sections 4
and 5. (In Section 7 we discuss policies that have other eﬀects.) To this end, we denote
the incumbent’s proﬁt in competition with a new entrant by πI (α),a n dt h ep r o ﬁto ft h e
5Note that c(·) must be convex if the entrant can randomize over its R&D strategy. We assume strict
convexity to simplify exposition in the simplest version of the model.
5entrant by πE (α), which we assume are diﬀerentiable functions of α.W el e tπ0
E (α) > 0,
so that a higher α represents a policy that is more “protective” of the entrant in the
sense that it raises the proﬁt of the entrant in the period of entry. Less clear, however,
is the overall eﬀect of an increase in α on the incentive to innovate, since an increase in
αwill alter as well the value of becoming a continuing incumbent. We also denote by the
diﬀerentiable function πm(α) the proﬁt of an incumbent who faces no competition in a
period. (In Sections 4 and 5, when we consider speciﬁc applications, we show how these
values can be derived from an underlying model of the product market.)
We examine stationary Markov perfect equilibria of the inﬁnite-horizon game using
the dynamic programming approach. Let VI denote the expected present discounted
proﬁts of an incumbent, and VE those of a potential entrant (both evaluated at the
beginning of a period). Then, since innovation occurs with probability φ,t h e s ev a l u e s
should satisfy
VI = πm (α)+δVI + φ[πI (α) − πm(α)+δ (VE − VI)], (2.1)
VE = δVE + φ[πE (α)+δ (VI − VE)] − c(φ). (2.2)
Also, a potential entrant’s choice of φ should maximize its expected discounted value.
Letting w ≡ πE (α)+δ(VI − VE) denote the expected discounted beneﬁtf r o mb e c o m i n g
a successful innovator–what we shall call the innovation prize–the optimal innovation
level is
Φ(w)=a r gm a x
φ∈[0,1]
{φw − c(φ)}.
Note that the maximizer is unique since the objective function is strictly concave. Note
also that Φ(·) is continuous (by Berge’s Theorem of the Maximum) and nondecreasing
(by the Monotone Selection Theorem of Milgrom and Shannon [1994]). Function Φ(·)
gives the innovation decision of the entrant as a function of the innovation prize w,a n d
its graph gives us an “innovation supply curve”, which we label IS in Figure 2.1.
Consider now the determinants of the innovation prize w. Subtracting (2.2) from
(2.1), solving for (VI − VE), and substituting its value into w ≡ πE +δ(VI − VE), allows


















us to express the innovation prize as w = W (φ,α),w h e r e
W (φ,α)=πE (α)+δ
∙
φπI (α)+( 1− φ)πm(α) − φπE (α)+c(φ)
1 − δ +2 δφ
¸
=
[1 − δ (1 − φ)]πE (α)+δ[φπI (α)+( 1− φ)πm(α)+c(φ)]
1 − δ +2 δφ
. (IB)
This equation deﬁnes an “innovation beneﬁt curve” – the value of the innovation prize
as a function of the innovation rate φ. In Figure 2.2 we graph it (labeled IB) along with
the IS curve. Points where the two curves intersect represent equilibrium values of (φ,w).
Note that the IS curve does not depend on α at all. As seen in Figure 2.2, if α shifts
the IB curve up (down) at all values of φ, then it increases (decreases) the equilibrium
8innovation rate in the “largest” and “smallest” equilibria (denoted by φ and φ respectively
in Figure 2.2). This can be established formally using comparative statics results of
Milgrom and Roberts [1994], which we do in the next section. When there is a unique
equilibrium, this result implies determinate comparative statics. Also, as evident in
Figure 2.2, the same local comparative statics must hold (using the Implicit Function
Theorem) at any “stable” equilibrium (at which the IB curve must cut the IS curve from
above) if the IB function is shifted up or down in a neighborhood of the equilibrium.
In what follows, we will say that a change in policy “increases (decreases) innovation”
whenever these comparative statics properties hold. Diﬀerentiating W (φ,α) with respect








1 − δ(1 − φ)
¸
≥ (≤)0 (2.3)
for all φ ∈ [0,1].
Condition (2.3) indicates how to sort through the potentially conﬂicting eﬀects of
antitrust policy on innovation incentives that arise from the policy’s dual eﬀects on
a successful entrant’s initial proﬁts and on its returns from achieving incumbency. It
shows that a change in policy encourages (discourages) innovation precisely when it raises
(reduces) the incremental expected discounted proﬁts over an innovation’s lifetime: The
ﬁrst term on the left side of (2.3) is the change in an entrant’s proﬁti nt h ep e r i o do f
entry due to the policy change, while the second term is equal to the change in the value
of a continuing incumbent (the numerator is the derivative of the ﬂow of expected proﬁts
in each period of incumbency conditional on still being an incumbent; the denominator
captures the “eﬀective” discount rate, which includes the probability of displacement),
and thus of the entrant’s value once it is itself established as the incumbent.
In interpreting condition (2.3), it is helpful to think about the case in which the
monopoly proﬁt πm is independent of the antitrust policy α,s ot h a tπ0
m(α)=0 .I nt h i s










I (α) ≥ (≤)0 . (2.4)
Thus, innovation increases if a weighted sum of π0
E (α) and π0
I (α) increases, where the
weight on π0
E (α) exceeds the weight on π0
I (α) due to discounting (δ<1). As illustrated in









Figure 2.3, this implies that a more protective antitrust policy raises innovation whenever
π0
I (α)+π0
E (α) ≥ 0; that is, provided that an increase in α does not lower the joint proﬁt
of the entrant and the incumbent in the period of entry. Intuitively, observe that a
successful innovator earns πE(α) when he enters, and earns πI(α) when he is displaced.
A more protective antitrust policy that raises πE and lowers πI has a front loading eﬀect,
eﬀectively shifting proﬁts forward in time. Since the later proﬁts πI are discounted, this
front loading of proﬁts necessarily increases the innovation prize provided that the joint
proﬁt πI + πE does not decrease.
Observe also that the weight on π0
I (α) is increasing in φ and in δ. Thus, as depicted
in Figure 2.3, the larger is δ or φ, the more likely is a more protective policy to reduce
innovation. For φ, this is so because larger φ moves forward the expected date when the
entrant will itself be displaced. For δ,t h i si ss ob e c a u s ew i t hl a r g e rδ the discounted
10value of the proﬁts in the period in which the entrant is displaced are greater. In the
limit, as δ → 1, the amount by which the joint proﬁt πE +πI can be dissipated while still
encouraging innovation converges to zero: in this limiting case, the cost of a one dollar
reduction in the value πI that the entrant will receive when he is ultimately displaced is
exactly equal to the gain from receiving a dollar more in the period in which he enters.
U pt ot h i sp o i n t( a n di nt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e r )w eh a v ef o c u s e do nas t a t i o n a r y
setting. However, the front-loading feature of protective antitrust policies suggests that
the rate of market growth may alter the impact of antitrust policy on innovation. As an
illustration, imagine that proﬁts in period 1 are instead βπI (α),βπE (α), and βπm (α) for
β ≤ 1,a n da r eπI (α),π E (α), and πm (α) from period 2 on. Following a similar derivation









1 − δ(1 − φ)
¸
≥ (≤)0 .
Thus, the greater is market growth (the lower is β), the less likely is it that period 1
innovation will increase. For example, when β<1 and π0
m(α)=0 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nα may
reduce innovation even when joint proﬁts upon entry increase (π0
I (α)+π0
E (α) ≥ 0).
3. Comparative Statics for More General Innovation Supply and
Beneﬁt
The fact that the comparative statics argument above did not depend on the particular
shapes of the innovation supply and innovation beneﬁt curves suggests that we can sub-
stantially generalize it. For one thing, we can generalize the innovation beneﬁtc u r v eb y
allowing all three of the proﬁts πI,π E,and πm to be aﬀected by the rate of innovation
φ. (This may happen because the price at which consumers purchase a durable good
or accept a long-term contract may depend on their expectation of the innovation rate,
as in the examples studied in Section 4.1 and Appendix C.) Denoting these proﬁts by
πI(α,φ),π E(α,φ), and πm(α,φ), we see that the argument of Section 3 continues to hold
if we reinterpret the derivatives in (2.3) as being partial derivatives with respect to α
holding φ ﬁxed.
We can also allow for alternative models of innovation supply, such as having more
than one potential entrant engage in R&D, or even allowing free entry (i.e., inﬁnitely
11many potential entrants). (We still do not allow the incumbent to do R&D; we discuss
relaxing this assumption in Section 6.) To do so, we deﬁne the industry’s “innovation
rate” φ as the probability that the incumbent technology is displaced with an innovation.
For a symmetric industry, φ also determines the potential entrants’ individual R&D
investments [and, hence, their R&D cost c(φ)] and the probability u(φ) that a given
potential entrant becomes a new incumbent (i.e., moves “up”). The expected present
discounted proﬁts of an incumbent (VI) a potential entrant (VE) can then be described
by
VI = πm (α)+δVI + φ[πI (α) − πm(α)+δ (VE − VI)], (VI∗)
VE = δVE + u(φ)[πE (α)+δ (VI − VE)] − c(φ). (VE∗)
Subtracting, we can express the innovation prize w = πE+δ (VI − VE) with the following
function:
W (φ,α)=
[1 − δ (1 − φ)]πE (α,φ)+δ[φπI (α,φ)+( 1− φ)πm(α,φ)+c(φ)]
1 − δ + δ(φ + u(φ))
. (IB∗)
As for the innovation supply curve, which describes the entrants’ R&D response to
a given innovation prize, our comparative statics results hold as long as the curve is
described by a correspondence Φ(w) satisfying the following three properties:
(IS1): Φ(·) is nonempty- and convex-valued;
(IS2) Φ(·) has a closed graph;
(IS3) Any selection from Φ(·) is nondecreasing (i.e., if w0 >w , φ
0 ∈ Φ(w0), and φ ∈ Φ(w),
then φ
0 ≥ φ).
For example, if Φ(·) is a function (i.e., single-valued), (IS1) is vacuous, (IS2) means
that the function is continuous, and (IS3) means that it is nondecreasing. Other corre-
spondences satisfying (IS1)-(IS3) are obtained by taking a nondecreasing function and
“ﬁlling in” its jumps, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.






13Properties (IS1)-(IS3) ensure that antitrust policy aﬀects the largest and smallest
equilibrium innovation rates in the same direction in which it shifts the innovation beneﬁt
curve, which we can determine by partially diﬀerentiating W (φ,α):
Proposition 3.1. If the innovation supply correspondence Φ(·) satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3) and
the innovation beneﬁt function W (φ,α) is continuous in φ, then the largest and smallest
equilibrium innovation rates exist, and both these rates are nondecreasing (nonincreasing)








1 − δ(1 − φ)
¸
≥ (≤)0 (3.1)
for all φ ∈ [0,1].
Proof. The equilibrium innovation rates are the ﬁx e dp o i n t so ft h ec o m p o s i t ec o r r e -
spondence γ (α,·) ≡ Φ(W (α,·)). (IS1)-(IS3) and the continuity of W (α,·) imply that
γ (α,φ)=[ γL (α,φ),γH (α,φ)] 6= ∅, and that the correspondence γ (α,·) is continuous
but for upward jumps (Milgrom and Roberts [1994]). Furthermore, if W (φ,α) is nonde-
creasing (nonincreasing) in α,t h e ns oa r eγL (α,φ) and γH (α,φ). Corollary 2 of Milgrom
and Roberts [1994] then establishes that the largest and smallest ﬁxed points of γ (α,·)
exist and are nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in α.
If there are multiple equilibria, this result does allow some equilibria to move in the
direction opposite to that predicted by Proposition 3.1. However, the same local com-
parative statics holds for any locally unique equilibrium φ(α) at which we have crossing













(which is a necessary condition for (Lyapunov)
stability.6)
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the innovation supply correspondence Φ(·) satisﬁes
(IS1)-(IS3) and the innovation beneﬁt function W (φ,α) is continuous in φ. Suppose,
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6Indeed, suppose that the industry in period t adaptively expects the future innovation rate to be






. If we have “crossing from below,” then the








, so that the equilibrium
is not (Lyapunov) stable.
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Crossing from above implies that φ(α) is also the unique ﬁxed point of the composite cor-




. Since this correspondence
satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3), the proof of Proposition 3.1 implies the result.
We now provide three examples in which (IS1)-(IS3) hold and so Propositions 3.1 and
3.2 determine the comparative statics eﬀect of antitrust policy on the rate of innovation.
3.1. Example: One entrant with constant returns R&D technology
Suppose that we still have one entrant but the R&D cost function is c(φ)=c·φ for c>0.
In this case, the innovation supply is no longer a function: Φ(w)=0if w<c , [0,∞] if
w = c,a n d1 if w>c . However, since Φ(·) satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3), Propositions 3.1 and 3.2
tell us that the same comparative statics apply.
3.2. Example: More than one potential entrant
Suppose that there are N>1 potential entrants in any period (in addition to the single
incumbent). In the beginning of each period, each potential entrant i independently
chooses its R&D rate ψi ∈ [0,1]; the cost of R&D is given by a convex function γ(ψi).
The R&D of a given potential entrant i yields a discovery with probability ψi (we assume
that the discoveries are independently realized). We shall focus on symmetric equilibria,
in which all potential entrants choose the same equilibrium level of R&D, denoted by
ψ. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h el i k e l i h o o dt h a ta tl e a s to n eo ft h eN potential entrants makes
a discovery is given by φ =
£
1 − (1 − ψ)N¤
. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium with
aggregate innovation rate φ, the potential entrants’ individual R&D choices are ψN (φ)=
1 − (1 − φ)
1/N.
15Among the potential entrants who make a discovery, only one may receive the patent
for the discovery. Denote by rN(ψ) the probability that a given potential entrant receives
a patent, conditional on it making a discovery, when all other potential entrants are doing
R&D at level ψ. W ea s s u m et h a trN(·) is a strictly decreasing function.7 Ap o t e n t i a l
entrant who is successful at receiving a patent enters and competes with the incumbent
in the present period, and then becomes the incumbent in the next period, while the
previous incumbent then becomes a potential entrant.
Note that in the symmetric equilibrium, the probability that a given entrant becomes
the incumbent is u(φ)=ψN (φ)rN (ψN (φ)),a n dt h ee n t r a n t ’ sR & Dc o s ti sc(φ)=
γ (ψN (φ)). The innovation beneﬁt curve is then given by substituting these expressions
in (IB∗)a b o v e .
As for the innovation supply, the equilibrium individual innovation rate solves the
following equilibrium condition for a given value of w
ψ =a r g m a x
ψ0∈[0,1]
{ψ
0rN (ψ)w − γ (ψ
0)}. (3.2)
As shown in Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, this describes a unique equilibrium level of ψ,
which is a continuous and nondecreasing function of w. These properties are preserved
for the aggregate equilibrium innovation rate φ, and so the aggregate innovation supply
Φ(·) satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3). Therefore, Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 apply to this model.
3.3. Example: Free entry
In some circumstances it may be more appropriate to assume that there is free entry into
R&D competition.8 This assumption can be interpreted as a limiting case of a very large
number N of potential entrants each of whom engages in an inﬁnitesimal amount of R&D












k(1 − ψ)N−1−k =




8The ﬁxed N model is the appropriate model when there are a limited number of ﬁrms with the
capability of doing R&D in an industry (perhaps because of complementary assets they possess due to
participation in related industries).
16while the aggregate innovation rate is positive. An innovator’s conditional probability of
getting a patent can then be written using the expression in footnote 7 as
¯ r(φ) = lim
N→∞












which is a continuous decreasing function of φ ∈ [0,1]. >From (3.2), the ﬁrst-order
condition for each potential entrant to choose a positive inﬁnitesimal R&D is w¯ r(φ)=
γ0 (0), which determines the innovation supply function Φ(w)=¯ r−1 (γ0 (0)/w) for w>
γ0 (0),a n dΦ(w)=0for w ≤ γ0 (0). Since this is a continuous and nondecreasing
function, the comparative statics is again described by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
3.4. Example: Free entry with a limited idea
In the models of Fudenberg and Tirole [2000] and O’Donohue et al. [1998], there are
inﬁnitely many potential entrants, but in each period only one of them is randomly
drawn to receive an “idea” that enables him to invest in R&D. This potential entrant
then observes a randomly drawn implementation cost γ and chooses whether to invest in
implementing the innovation. If he does, he is certain to become the next incumbent.
Observe ﬁrst that the optimal strategy of potential entrants takes the form of choosing
a cost threshold ¯ γ below which to implement their idea. This is equivalent to choosing
the probability of innovation φ =P r {γ ≤ ¯ γ} ≡ F(¯ γ), and the associated expected
innovation cost
R γ
0 γdF (γ). In other words, the innovation supply is equivalent to having
a single potential entrant who chooses an innovation probability φ at an expected cost
of
R F−1(φ)
0 γdF (γ), which is a convex function of φ. Thus, the innovation supply curve is
determined just as in the single-ﬁrm model, and satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3). For the innovation
beneﬁt curve, on the other hand, in (IB∗)w et a k ec(φ)=u(φ)=0since each potential
entrant in expectation does not incur any cost and has zero chance of innovating. Once
again, the comparative statics are described by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
4. Applications: R&D-Deterring Activities
In this section, we use the results of Section 3 to analyze two models in which an incum-
bent engages in activities designed to deter the R&D of potential entrants. The models
we consider are all versions of the “quality ladder” models introduced in the recent lit-
17erature on economic growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt [1992]; Grossman and Helpman
[1991]). Our results in this section will apply for any continuous nondecreasing innovation
supply function.
Before turning to these applications, we ﬁrst make a surprising observation: In many
circumstances, the tension between a more protective policy’s eﬀect on a new entrant
and its eﬀect on an incumbent will not arise, at least once we hold the rate of innovation
ﬁxed, as Proposition 3.1 suggests we do.
To see why, consider the following stylized model: Imagine that at the end of each
period the ﬁrm with the leading technology can commit to some behavior d ∈ R that
aﬀects both its proﬁts and an entrant’s proﬁts in the following period. Let these proﬁts
be given by functions b πm(d), b πI(d),a n db πE(d),w h e r eb π
0
E(d) < 0 (for simplicity we
assume that these functions do not depend on φ, although this is inessential). Consider
a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in which potential entrant R&D is a decreasing
function of the state variable d (chosen in the previous period) given by the function
φ
∗(d) with φ
∗0(d) < 0. Then, the equilibrium level of d absent any antitrust constraint,
d∗, maximizes
φ
∗(d)[b πI(d)+δVE]+( 1− φ
∗(d))[b πm(d)+δVI], (4.1)










∗)+δVE] − [b πm(d
∗)+δVI]} =0 .
Thus, [b πI(d∗)+δVE]−[b πm(d∗)+δVI] ≤ 0 (which says that it is valuable to the incumbent
to prevent entry) implies that [φb π
0
I(d∗)+( 1− φ)b π
0
m(d∗)] ≥ 0: a small reduction in d,
holding φ ﬁxed,a c t u a l l yraises the proﬁt of a continuing incumbent. This tells us that if
the antitrust policy α requires that d ≤ d∗ − α,t h e nf o rs m a l lα no tension arises: both
terms in condition (3.1) are nonnegative, and so innovation necessarily increases when a
slightly protective antitrust policy is introduced.9
More generally, suppose that the function φb πI(d)+( 1− φ)b πm(d) is a diﬀerentiable
pseudo-concave function of d, so that there is a peak at some d∗∗, with the function
increasing at d ≤ d∗∗ and decreasing at d ≥ d∗∗.( d∗∗ is the level of d that an incumbent
unconcerned with preventing entry would choose.) Then, for equilibria in which the
antitrust constraint binds, and antitrust constraints that are not so severe as to force
9Formally, taking πj(α) ≡ b πE(d∗ − α) for j = m,I,E,w eh a v eφb π
0
I(α)+( 1− φ)b π
0
m(α) ≥ 0
18dbelow d∗∗, both incumbent and entrant proﬁts increase with an increase in α holding φ
ﬁxed, and hence so does the rate of innovation.
The key insight here comes because of Proposition 3.1’s characterization, which in-
structs us to think about proﬁte ﬀects holding the rate of innovation φ ﬁxed. This
frequently eliminates the apparent tension between the eﬀects of policy changes on en-
trant and incumbent proﬁts: If (on the margin) an R&D-deterring activity involves a
sacriﬁce in incumbent proﬁt in return for a reduction in the probability of entry then,
holding φ ﬁxed, both entrant and incumbent proﬁts are increased by a more protective
policy, and so innovation increases.
We now turn to two more speciﬁc applications in which we derive the relevant proﬁt
functions from fundamentals, and in which there is a fully speciﬁed consumer side, so
that welfare analysis is possible.
4.1. Long-term (exclusive) contracts
We ﬁrst consider a model in which the incumbent can sign consumers to long-term
contracts. There are at least 2 ﬁrms and a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived consumers of
measure 1 who may consume a nonstorable and nondurable good with production cost
k ≥ 0. R&D may improve the quality of this good and consumers value “generation j”
of the good at vj = v + j · ∆.A t a n y t i m e t,o n eﬁrm – the current “incumbent” –
possesses a perfectly eﬀective and inﬁnitely-lived patent on the latest generation product
jt. Likewise, at time t there is a patentholder for each of the previous generations of
the product (jt − 1,j t − 2,...). We assume, as in Sections 2 and 3, that at time t only
ﬁrms other than the incumbent in the leading technology – the potential entrants – can
invest in developing the generation jt +1product. One implication of this assumption
is that in each period t the holder of the patent on generation jt −1 is a ﬁrm other than
the current incumbent, who holds the patent on the current leading generation jt.
Suppose that in each period t, the incumbent can oﬀer long-term contracts to a share
βt+1 of period t+1consumers. The contracts specify a sale in period t+1 at a price qt+1 to
be paid upon delivery. (In our simple model, this is equivalent to an exclusive contract
that prevents the consumer from buying from the entrant, subject to some irrelevant
issues with the timing of payments.) The antitrust policy restricts the proportion of
consumers that can be oﬀered long-term contracts: βt+1 ≤ 1 − α. We assume that the
production cost kexceeds the quality increment ∆, so that an entrant cannot proﬁtably
make a sale to a consumer who is bound to a long-term contract.
19The timing in period t is:
• Stage t.1: Each potential entrant i observes the share of captured consumers βt
and chooses its innovation rate ψit. Then innovation success is realized.
• Stage t.2: Firms name prices pi
t to free period t consumers.
• Stage t.3: Free period t consumers accept/reject these oﬀers.
• Stage t.4: The ﬁrm with the leading technology chooses to oﬀe rt oas h a r eβt+1 ≤
1−α of period t+1consumers a period t+1sales contract at price qt+1 to be paid
upon delivery.
• Stage t.5: Period t+1consumers accept/reject these contract oﬀers (they assume
that they have no eﬀect on the likelihood of future entry).10
Observe that when α =0so that no long-term contracts can be written, we have a
simple model in which in each period there is Bertrand competition between the leading
ﬁrm and ﬁrms further down the ladder occurs each period. In Appendix B, we discuss this
benchmark quality ladder model, and the distortions in the rate of innovation relative to
the ﬁrst-best level that arise. In general, innovation may be either insuﬃcient or excessive
because of “Schumpeterian” and “business stealing” eﬀects.
Here we focus on Markov perfect equilibria. In particular, we study equilibria in which
potential entrants in stage t.1 condition their innovation choices only on the current share
of captive customers βt, and in which the choices at all other stages are stationary. (Note
that since period t contracts expire at the end of that period, there is no relevant state
variable aﬀecting the contracting choice of the leading ﬁrm at stage t.4.)
It is immediate that in any such equilibrium, the prices oﬀered to free customers
in any period t are k + ∆ by the ﬁrm with the leading technology jt, who wins the
sale, and k by the ﬁrm with technology jt − 1. Now consider a consumer’s decision of
whether to accept a long-term contract. If in period t the expected probability of entry
in period t +1is φt+1, ap e r i o dt +1consumer who rejects the leading ﬁrm’s long-term
contract oﬀer anticipates getting the period t surplus level v +( jt − 1)∆ − k plus an
expected gain in surplus of φt+1∆ due to the possibility of technological advancement
10We assume throughout that consumers all accept if accepting is a continuation equilibrium (we do
not allow consumers to coordinate). The leading ﬁrm could achieve this by, for example, committing to
auction oﬀ the desired number of long-term contracts.
20in period t +1 . Thus, he will accept the contract if and only if the price qt+1 satisﬁes




∆ − k. Hence, the maximum price the incumbent
can receive in a long-term contract is qt+1 = k +(1−φt+1)∆,w h i c hl e a v e st h ec o n s u m e r
indiﬀerent about signing.
How many consumers will the leading ﬁrm sign up in period t?O b s e r v e ﬁrst that
if the probability of entry φt+1 were independent of βt+1, then the leading ﬁrm would
be indiﬀerent about signing up an extra consumer: its period texpectation of the proﬁt
from a free consumer in period t +1is (1 − φt+1)∆, which exactly equals its maximal
expected proﬁt from a long-term contract. However, φ is nonincreasing in βt+1, because
an increase in the share of captive customers reduces the proﬁts a successful entrant can
collect in period t+1.11 Therefore, the incumbent optimally signs up as many long-term
customers as the antitrust constraint allows, i.e., βt+1 =1− α in every period. We can
therefore ﬁt this model into our basic model by taking
πm(α,φ)=α∆ +( 1− α)(1 − φ)∆ (4.2)
πI(α,φ)=( 1 − α)(1 − φ)∆
πE(α,φ)=α∆.
Observe, ﬁrst, that in this model an increase in α does indeed raise πE.M o r es i g n i ﬁ-
cantly,
[φπI(α,φ)+( 1− φ)πm(α,φ)] = (1 − φ)α∆ +( 1− α)(1 − φ)∆ =( 1− φ)∆.
Thus, holding φ ﬁxed, the expected proﬁt of a continuing incumbent is independent of α.
The reason is that, holding φ ﬁxed, it is a matter of indiﬀerence to both the incumbent
(and consumers) whether consumers accept a long-term contract. This is a case in which
an R&D-deterring activity has no cost to the incumbent. Thus, we see immediately that
condition (3.1) is satisﬁed, and so we have:
11Formally, the innovation rate of a potential entrant in period t +1when a share βt+1 of period








E are the continuation values at the start of period t +2 , which are independent of βt+1. By (IS3),
this innovation rate is nonincreasing in βt+1.
21Proposition 4.1. In our basic model of long-term (exclusive) contracts, restricting the
use of long-term (exclusive) contracts encourages innovation.
Consider now the welfare eﬀects of a once-and-for-all increase in the policy α in some
period τ. We assume that this intervention occurs just after stage τ.1.12 The payoﬀ eﬀects
of such a change begin in period τ +1 . Note, ﬁrst, that the increase raises consumer
surplus: consumers are indiﬀerent about signing exclusives when the innovation rate is
held ﬁxed, but an increase in the innovation rate delivers to them higher-quality goods
at the same prices. What about the sum of consumer surplus and current incumbent
(i.e., the ﬁrm with the leading technology just after stage τ.1)p r o ﬁts? There is no direct
eﬀect of the policy change on either consumers or the current incumbent because, holding
φﬁxed, both are indiﬀerent about whether long-term contracts are signed. What about
the indirect eﬀect caused by the increase in φ?I n t u i t i v e l y ,a ni n n o v a t i o ni np e r i o dτ +1
reallocates surplus α∆ from the incumbent to period τ +1consumers. However, in
subsequent periods the innovation confers an expected beneﬁt ∆ to consumers but at an
expected cost to the incumbent that is less than ∆ as long as the probability of future
displacement is positive (i.e., φ>0 ).
Now consider the eﬀects on potential entrants. Observe that in each of the examples
we considered in Sections 3.1-3.4, u(Φ(w))w − c(Φ(w)) is nondecreasing in w, i.e., each
potential entrant is better oﬀ if the innovation prize increases. We refer to this as the
Value Monotonicity Property. Since we are moving upward along the upward-sloping IS
curve when α increases, the increase in φ caused by the increase in α must be associated
with an increase in w. When the Value Monotonicity Property is satisﬁed, this implies
that each potential entrant becomes (weakly) better oﬀ. Finally, what about the current
incumbent? This turns out to be ambiguous: on one hand, the increase in φspeeds the
incumbent’s displacement. On the other hand, the value VE that the incumbent receives
when he is displaced may increase. This reasoning leads to the following result:
Proposition 4.2. A once-and-for-all restriction on the share of long-term (exclusive)
contracts that raises innovation raises consumer surplus, aggregate welfare, and (when
12We make this assumption to simplify the analysis. By doing so, the equilibrium innovation rate
transitions immediately to its new steady state value and all payoﬀ changes begin in period τ +1 .I f ,
instead, the intervention occurs at the start of the period, there would be a one period transitory eﬀect
on the innovation rate because in period τ the share of captive customers facing an entrant would be
t h el e v e lf r o mb e f o r et h ep o l i c yc h a n g ew h i l et h ec o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u e sVI and VE starting in period τ +1
would be the levels in the new steady state.
22the Value Monotonicity Property is satisﬁed) the values of potential entrants. The eﬀect
on the current incumbent’s value is ambiguous.
Proof. In Appendix A.
It is perhaps surprising that the welfare eﬀect of an increase in αis necessarily positive,
given that the equilibrium innovation rate may be above the ﬁrst-best level due to business
stealing (see Appendix B). Note, however, that long-term contracts involve an ineﬃciency
since when entry occurs the incumbent makes sales of an old technology to captive
consumers. Thus, even if an increase in the share of captive consumers brings a socially
excessive innovation rate closer to the ﬁrst-best level, the waste eﬀect dominates and
aggregate welfare is reduced.13
In the model above, holding φ ﬁxed, incumbent and entrant proﬁts both increased
with a more protective policy, and so innovation necessarily increased. In Appendix C, we
consider an extension of this long-term contracting model in which the innovation sizes
(∆) are uncertain ex ante and there is a cost of rapidly implementing new innovations.
The key new feature in this model is that antitrust policy has a “selection eﬀect”: by
altering the proﬁtability of entry, antitrust policy alters the set of innovations that rapidly
enter the market. We show in Appendix C that in this situation, limitations on long-term
contracting may retard innovation.
4.2. Compatibility in a network industry
We next consider a model of compatibility choices by a leading ﬁrm in an industry with
network externalities. The model is patterned after Fudenberg and Tirole [2000] who
studied limit pricing in a dynamic model.14 Overlapping generations of consumers live
for two periods, and make purchases only when young. Each generation is of unit mass.
The value of consumption in a period t is v + jt∆ + v(N) if the consumer consumes
the leading quality good jt and this good has a “network size” of N. We follow the
convention in the network externalities literature and assume that consumers in each
generation coordinate their purchases, acting as a single agent and purchasing from a
single ﬁrm. We also assume that ∆ >v (2) − v(1). This implies that the ﬁrm with
13Indeed, observe that potential entrants, who directly suﬀer from the business-stealing eﬀect, are
necessarily better oﬀ when α increases.
14There are several key diﬀerences: we have only one type of consumer (so limit pricing is not possible),
ﬁrms make compatibility choices, and patent protection lasts forever.
23the leading quality will also have the leading eﬀective quality once we include network
beneﬁts, regardless of the network sizes of the various goods.
There are many ways in which compatibility is determined in actual markets. Here
we focus on one that leads to a relatively simple model that ﬁts our framework. We
assume that each ﬁrm that oﬀers its product to consumers chooses a price p and also
a compatibility level β ∈ [0,1] of this product with higher quality products. Network
beneﬁts are then determined as follows: the network size enjoyed by generation g of
consumers who have bought good j is 2 if all consumers in a period consume it, is 1 if
the other existing generation of consumers consumes a higher quality good, and is 1+βl
if the other existing generation of consumers consumes a lower quality product lwhich
has compatibility level βl with higher quality products. That is, while consumers of high
quality products can beneﬁt from the existence of consumers who consume a lower quality
product (to the extent that this good’s producer allows), the reverse is not true.15,16 The
cost of producing a product with compatibility level β is k(β).W ed e ﬁne k ≡ mink(β).
In each period t the game proceeds as follows:
• Stage t.1: Each potential entrant i (ﬁrms other than the producer of the leading
quality product) observes the purchase choice and compatibility level βt−1 of the
current old generation of consumers. Potential entrants then make their R&D
choices and innovation success is realized.
• Stage t.2: Firms choose compatibility levels β
i
t and name prices pi
t to young con-
sumers.
• Stage t.3: Young consumers make their purchase decisions.
Our policy parameter α ∈ [0,1] will put a lower bound on the compatibility level
that the ﬁrm with the leading technology can choose.17 We focus here on Markov perfect
equilibria in which the leading ﬁrm (whether a continuing incumbent or a new entrant)
15As an example, consider 386 and 486 chips: software designed for 386 machines also worked on 486
machines, but not the reverse.
16In essence, we assume that the higher quality product can costlessly achieve as much backward
compatibility as the lower quality ﬁrm allows. Were we to allow the higher quality ﬁrm a choice of
whether it wants backward compatibility (at no cost), it would always choose the maximal possible level.
Regarding the lower quality product, our assumptions allow its producer to commit to a compatibility
level. This may be thought of as a product design choice. For example, a patented interface may prevent
a new entrant from achieving backward compatibility.
17We remark below on the eﬀects of having all ﬁrms subject to this constraint.
24always wins the sales to young consumers, and in which the probability of entry in
period t +1when period t’s leading quality ﬁrm sold today’s old consumers a product
with compatibility level βt,φ
∗(βt), is increasing in βt.18 We let VI(β) denote the value of
an incumbent seller who has the highest quality and yesterday sold products of quality
β to today’s old consumers. It will also be useful to deﬁne
B(φ) ≡ v(2) + δ[(1 − φ)v(2) + φv(1)].
This is the discounted expected network beneﬁt that a young consumer anticipates if he
buys the product of a continuing incumbent seller (who has previously sold to today’s
old consumers) when the probability of entry tomorrow is φ.
Consider, ﬁrst, the period t pricing, compatibility choice, and proﬁt of a continuing
incumbent who has the highest quality in a period without entry. Its relevant competitor
is the ﬁrm with the next-highest quality product, the previous incumbent. The previous
incumbent can oﬀer the young consumers a surplus of19
[v +( jt − 1)∆]+( 1+δ)v(1) − k.









∗(α))]−[v(1)(1+δ)−k]} today from sales to current
young consumers and a continuation value of VI(β
∗(α)).
Now consider the period t pricing, compatibility choice, and proﬁt of an entrant
against a continuing incumbent that prior to this entry was the highest quality ﬁrm and
yesterday sold a product with compatibility level βt to the current old consumers. Its
18Oﬀ the equilibrium path, when a ﬁrm other than the leading quality ﬁrm has won the sales to
yesterday’s young consumers, the probability of entry will be φ
∗(1) since the leading quality ﬁrm will
have no existing network, leaving entrants in the same strategic situation as when a leading quality ﬁrm
makes sales but chooses to be fully compatible.
19Recall that, in this equilibrium, if today’s young consumers buy from the previous incumbent, then
tomorrow’s young consumers are certain to buy from a diﬀerent ﬁrm.
25relevant competitor is the continuing incumbent. The continuing incumbent can oﬀer
the young consumers a surplus of20
[v +( jt − 1)∆]+[ v(2) + δv(1) − k].
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current consumers and a continuation value of VI(β
∗(α)).21 Of course, in equilibrium, we
will have βt = β
∗(α).
Now consider equilibria in which the antitrust constraint binds, i.e., in which β
∗(α)=
α. For these equilibria we have:
πm(α,φ)=∆ + {[B(φ) − k(α)] − [v(1)(1 + δ) − k]}
πI(α,φ)=0 (4.3)
πE(α,φ)=∆ + {[B(φ)+v(1 + α) − v(2) − k(α)] −
[v(2) + δv(1) − k]}.
To see the eﬀect of a more protective antitrust policy on innovation, consider ﬁrst
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hk(·) is decreasing so that it is costly to block compatibility by a
higher quality entrant. In this case, a ﬁrm choosing to be incompatible incurs increased
production costs today to deter R&D and reduce tomorrow’s likelihood of entry. As
is evident from (4.3), in this case πm and πE both increase when αincreases, while
πI remains unchanged. Again, no tension arises, and Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 tell us that
with this type of R&D-deterring behavior, innovation increases with a more protective
policy.
20Once again, in this equilibrium, if today’s young consumers buy from the previous incumbent, then
tomorrow’s young consumers are certain to buy from a diﬀerent ﬁrm.
21>From this one can verify that the innovation rate will be nonincreasing in βt−1 in any model
satisfying (IS1)-(IS3).
26When k(·)is not everywhere decreasing in β, however, increased protectiveness may
instead lower innovation. For example, suppose that k(·)is convex with its minimum at
β ∈ (0,1). Examining (4.3), we see that increasing αabove β may reduce innovation:
it certainly lowers πm and may even lower πE [if v(1 + α) − k(α) falls].22 In this case,
forcing compatibility above the level that minimizes costs may reduce R&D. At such
compatibility levels, increases in protectiveness no longer have the eﬀects that arise with
standard “R&D-deterring activities” because we are no longer in a region where the
incumbent is trading oﬀ reduced proﬁts today for reduced R&D tomorrow.
A full investigation of the welfare eﬀects of a more protective policy in this model is
beyond our scope here. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in this model innovation can
be excessive even with only a single potential entrant (in contrast to our benchmark model
in Appendix B). The reason is that an externality exists between the two generations of
consumers in each period: when the young purchase an entrant’s product they leave old
consumers with lower network beneﬁts. Indeed, while young consumers have a beneﬁt
of [∆ − v(2) + v(1 + β
∗(α))] in the ﬁrst period that an entrant is in the market, the old
consumers lose [v(2)−v(1)]. Thus, when ∆
1−δ < [2v(2)−v(1)−v(1+β
∗(α))], an innovation
lowers aggregate welfare, even ignoring R&D costs. Thus, it would not be surprising if a
more protective policy that raises innovation could lower aggregate welfare here.
5. Applications: Voluntary Deals
Although we have motivated our analysis by discussing examples of exclusionary behav-
iors, our framework is not limited to such applications. Another sort of behavior to which
we can apply our model is a voluntary deal between an incumbent and a new entrant.
With the innovation rate held ﬁxed, voluntary deals – by deﬁnition – raise both parties’
payoﬀs.23 By Proposition 3.1, such deals should therefore increase innovation. Here we
brieﬂy consider two examples of such deals.
22If the policy instead applied to all ﬁrms, then we would have k = k(α); in this case πm and πE
would still be increasing in α, so innovation would increase with α.
23This conclusion depends on the fact that we have only two parties negotiating. With more than two
active ﬁrms, proﬁts for some or all parties may fall when voluntary deals are allowed (see Segal [1999]).
275.1. Licensing of the entrant’s technology
Imagine that in our long-term contracting model the incumbent can license a new en-
trant’s technology for serving his captive consumers. Speciﬁcally, assume that the in-
cumbent is then able to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to these captive buyers, oﬀering
to give them instead the entrant’s better product for an additional payment of ∆. The
incumbent and the entrant split the gain from the agreement.We now denote the lower
bound on the share of free consumers by α∗ and let our policy parameter of interest
α ∈ [0,1] be the probability that such a deal is allowed. Under these assumptions,
πm(α,φ)=α∗∆ +( 1− α∗)(1 − φ)∆, πI(α,φ)=( 1− α∗)[(1 − φ)∆ + α(∆/2)],a n d
πE(α,φ)=α∗∆ +( 1− α∗)α(∆/2)],a n ds ob o t hπI and πE will increase, while πm will
be unaﬀected when αincreases. As such, Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 tell us that the rate
of innovation will increase if such voluntary licensing deals are allowed. Moreover, using
similar reasoning to that in Proposition 4.2, we can show that allowing such deals also
increases aggregate welfare.24
5.2. Price collusion
As another example of a voluntary deal, set α =0in our long-term contracting model (so
we are in the benchmark model of Appendix B). Suppose, however, that an incumbent
and an entrant may be able to collude in their pricing to consumers in the period in
which the entrant enters. We let α =1if collusion is allowed, and α =0if it is not
allowed. We assume also that a technology enters the public domain in the period after
it is superceded, so that the only opportunity for collusion is in the period of entry.25
Hence, in periods without entry the continuing incumbent earns ∆ as before. In periods
with entry, the entrant will make the sale to consumers at a price of k +( 1+α)∆, and
split equally the joint gain from collusion α∆ with the incumbent by means of a side
payment. Hence, πE (α)=( 1 + α/2)∆, πI (α)=α∆/2,a n dπm (α)=∆.T h e r a t e
of innovation is therefore increasing in the degree of allowed collusion α.I n t h i s c a s e ,
however, the welfare eﬀects are not clear. We cannot use the same type of argument as
in Proposition 4.2 to show that welfare increases, because the direct eﬀect of the change
24As in the long-term contracting model, both the direct eﬀect of the policy change and the indirect
eﬀect of the induced increase in innovation on the current incumbent plus consumers is positive. Since
potential entrants are again be better oﬀ if the rate of innovation increases (assuming that the Value
Monotonicity Property holds), this implies that aggregate welfare increases.
25The purpose of this assumption is just to limit the size of the gain from collusion.
28on the current incumbent plus consumers is negative. Indeed, observe that there is no
direct eﬃciency eﬀect arising from this collusive arrangement; it is merely a transfer from
consumers to the ﬁrms. Thus, the sign of the eﬀect on aggregate welfare is determined
simply by whether we were initially in a situation of over- or under-investment in R&D
relative to the socially optimal symmetric rate of innovation.26
6. Incumbent Innovation
The analysis above imposed the strong restriction that only potential entrants engaged in
R&D. Although useful for gaining insight, this assumption is clearly not respresentative
of most settings of interest. In this section, we explore how our conclusions are aﬀected
when incumbent ﬁrms may also engage in R&D.
Allowing incumbent ﬁrms to engage in R&D has the potential to considerably com-
plicate the analysis. In particular, once we allow for incumbent investment, we need in
general to introduce a state space to keep track of the incumbent’s current lead over the
potential entrants. In general, the rates of R&D investment by the incumbent and its
challengers may be state dependent (see, for example, Aghion et. al. [2001]).
Here we focus on two special cases in which R&D strategies are nonetheless station-
ary. Although clearly restrictive, these two models do have the virtue of capturing two
distinct motives for incumbent R&D: (i) preventing displacement by an entrant, and (ii)
increasing the ﬂow of proﬁts until displacement by increasing the lead over the previous
incumbent.
6.1. R&D to prevent displacement
Suppose the incumbent can do R&D denoted by φI, while the potential entrants’ ag-
gregate R&D is now denoted by φE. Similarly, the incumbent’s and entrants’ respective
cost functions are denoted by cI(φI) and cE(φE) (we allow for the fact that the cost of
achieving a discovery may diﬀer between the incumbent and the potential entrants). In
this ﬁrst model, we assume that if the leading quality level in period tis jt, then quality
level jt − 1 is freely available to all potential producers. That is, it enters the public
domain. Thus, the incumbent never has a lead greater than one step on the ladder.
26In a model with more general demand functions there would be an additional eﬃciency loss from
the collusive deal because of increased pricing distortions.
29If so, the only reason for an incumbent to do R&D is to try to get the patent on the
next innovation in cases in which at least one potential entrant has made a discovery —
that is, to prevent its displacement.27 With these assumptions, we need not keep track
of any states, and there is a stationary equilibrium. We restrict ourselves here to mak-
ing two simple points: (i) there are some simples cases in which the incumbent chooses
zero innovation in equilibrium and so all our previous results go through, (ii) in some
cases, antitrust policy may have positive direct eﬀects on both the incumbent’s and the
entrants’ innovation rates, although (iii) the strategic interaction among the innovation
rates may preclude signing the comparitive statics eﬀects.
To proceed, let rI (φE) denote the probability that the incumbent who innovates
preserves the incumbency, which allows us to express the probability that the incum-
bent is displaced by an entrant as d(φI,φ E) ≡ (1 − φI)φE + φI (1 − rI (φE)). Also, let
u(φI,φ E) denote the probability that a given entrant innovates and then becomes the
next incumbent.
The values VI and VE of the incumbent and a potential entrant must then satisfy
VI = πm(α,φ)+δVI + d(φ){πI(α,φ) − πm(α,φ) − δ(VI − VE)} − cI(φI) (VI∗∗)
VE = δVE + u(φ)[πE(α,φ)+δ(VI − VE)] − cE(φE), (VE∗∗)
where φ =( φI,φ E). The incumbent will choose R&D to solve
φI ∈ arg max
ψI∈[0,1]
ψIwI − cI(ψI),w h e r e
wI ≡ [rI (φE) − (1 − φE)]{πm(α,φ) − πI(α,φ)+δ(VI − VE)} (6.1)
27In the usual sort of (Poisson) continuous-time model considered in the R&D literature (see, e.g.,
Lee and Wilde [1980], Reinganum [1989], and Grossman and Helpman [1991]), the probability of ties
is zero, and so one might worry that our formulation here is dependent on a merely technical feature
of the discrete-time set-up. Indeed, in such a model, the incumbent would do no R&D here. However,
the usual continuous-time model relies on the implicit assumption that following an innovation, all ﬁrms
reorient their R&D activity instantaneously to the next technology level. If we were to instead use a
continuous-time model in which there is a ﬁxed time period after a rival’s success before which R&D
for the next technology level cannot be successful, then we would get eﬀects that parallel those in our
discrete-time model (where the discount factor δ reﬂects how quickly R&D activity can be reoriented to
the next technology level.) Thus, our discrete-time formulation captures an arguably realistic feature of
the economics of R&D.
30is the incumbent’s expected incremental gain from making a discovery. As for the po-
tential entrants, they are facing innovation prize
wE = πE(α,φ)+δ(VI − VE), (6.2)
and will choose φE ∈ Φ(wE,φ I),w h e r eΦ(·,φ I) is the entrants’ innovation supply corre-
spondence.
The following example shows some some in which the incumbent will do no R&D in
equilibrium, and so our previous results would apply without modiﬁcation:
Example 6.1. Suppose that we have either a single entrant and that when the en-





=( 1 − φ−i/2) for i = I,E, and the entrant’s R&D level is
φE ∈ argmaxψE∈[0,1] ψErE (φI)wE − cE(ψE). Suppose also that the entrant and incum-
bent share the same R&D cost function. Comparing with (6.1), we see two countervailing
asymmetries between the entrant and incumbent:
• When πm ≥ πI + πE, which captures the “eﬃciency eﬀect” (that a monopoly
maximizes industry proﬁts), the term in curly brackets in (6.1) is larger than the
entrants’ innovation prize.
• The incumbent’s innovation prize contains a factor rI (φE) − (1 − φE), while the
entrant’s prize is multiplied by rI (φE). This captured the “replacement eﬀect”:
the incumbent’s innovation only results in him in “replacing” himself and so has
no value if the entrant does not innovate, while an entrant’s innovation is valuable
when the incumbent did not innovate.
For a more speciﬁc example, consider an extension of our long-term (exclusive)
contracting model to allow for incumbent investment. We now assume that a long-
term contract is a commitment by the incumbent to deliver his best current product
in the next period. In this case, consumers gain ∆ in surplus when the incumbent
gets a new patent regardless of whether they have signed a long-term contract since
the previous leading product enters the public domain. The price of a long-term
contract will therefore be qt+1 = k +( 1− d(φ))∆,a n dt h ep r o ﬁt functions can be
31written as
πm(α,φ)=α∆ +( 1− α)(1 − d(φ))∆
πI(α,φ)=( 1 − α)(1 − d(φ))∆ (6.3)
πE(α,φ)=α∆.
Thus, here the eﬃciency eﬀect is zero: πm = πI + πE. Then, due to the replacement
eﬀect, in equilibrium we must have φE ≥ φI. If, in addition, the common R&D cost
function has constant returns to scale so that cE(φ)=cI(φ)=c·φ,t h e nw eh a v eφI =0 .
The same conclusion obtains the free entry case with the same long-term contract-
ing model. Indeed, in this case, rI (φE)=¯ r(φE). Also, if the incumbent does not
invest in R&D, then each entrant makes an inﬁnitesimal investment ψE ∈ argmax ψE∈[0,1]
e ψE¯ r(φE)wE − cE(e ψE). Then (6.1) implies that, as long as the incumbent and entrants
share the same cost function, the incumbent will indeed choose a zero investment.
To examine the eﬀects of antitrust policy in the general case in which both the in-
cumbent and potential entrants do R&D , solve (VI∗∗)a n d( V E ∗∗)f o r(VI − VE) and
substitute it in (6.1, 6.2). This yields (suppressing the arguments of functions)
wI =
rI − (1 − φE)
1 − δ + δ (d + u)
{πm − (1 − δ)πI + δu(πm − πE − πI)+δ(cE − cI)}, (6.4)
wE =
1
1 − δ + δ (d + u)
{δπm +( 1− δ)πE − δd(πm − πE − πI)+δ(cE − cI)}. (6.5)
Consider ﬁrst the direct eﬀects of a change in the policy α. For the incumbent, the
former captures the change in its R&D incentives holding ﬁxed the R&Dof potential
entrants φE, and has the same sign as the change in wI caused by the change in α
holding (φI,φ E) ﬁxed. Similarly, the direct eﬀect for the potential entrants has the same
sign as the change in wE caused by the change in α holding (φI,φ E) ﬁxed. The following
proposition summarizes these direct eﬀects:
Proposition 6.2. In the model of incumbent R&D to prevent displacement, the direct
eﬀect of a more protective antitrust policy (an increase in α)on potential entrant R&D
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≥ (≤)0 (6.6)
for all α and all φ ∈ [0,1]
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2.
Observe ﬁrst that the condition (6.6) describing the direct eﬀect on entrant inno-
vation of the policy change is the same as condition (3.1), but with the probability of
incumbent displacement now being d(φ) instead of φ. Turning to the direct eﬀect on
the incumbent, note that the direct eﬀects of a more protective antitrust policy on in-
cumbent and potential entrant innovation can both be positive. For instance, this is the
case in the exclusive contracts model described in the above example. Indeed, in this
case, hodling innovation ﬁxed, antitrust policy increases the continuing monopoly proﬁt
πm and reduces the incumbent’s proﬁt πI, thus raising the incument’s incentive to avoid
displacement. The direct eﬀects are not determinative, however, of the overall change
in equilibrium innovation rates, because there are interactions between the R&D levels
of the incumbent and potential entrants since the level of φi aﬀects the innovation value
w−i (i = I,E).
6.2. R&D to increase proﬁt ﬂows
We next consider a model in which rivals do not get access to the second best technology
when the incumbent innovates. Thus, the incumbent can increase its ﬂow of proﬁts by
innovating, until the time when it is displaced. Speciﬁcally, let s denote the number
of steps that the incumbent is ahead of its nearest rival (this is our state variable).
The variable s aﬀects the incumbent’s proﬁt ﬂow when entry does not occur, which
we now denote by πs
m(α,φE) (it does not aﬀect either πI or πE). We now make two
assumptions that will imply that there is an equilibrium in which the R&D levels of the
incumbent and potential entrants do not depend upon s. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
33πs
m(α,φ)=µ(α,φ)+sπm(α,φ) and that an entrant gets the patent whenever at least
one entrant has made a discovery.
Example 6.3. Consider again the extension of the long-term (exclusive) contracts model
to incumbent innovation introduced in Example 6.1. A contract again is a promise to
deliver the incumbent’s leading technology product in the next period. To ﬁti n t oo u r
framework here, however, we change the timing of the payment in this contract, assuming
instead that the payment is made when the contract is signed. Following similar reasoning
as in Example 6.1 we see that28,29
π
s
m(α,φ)=αs∆ +( 1− α)[(s + φI)(1 − φE)∆ − (1 − δ)k]
=( 1 − α)[φI(1 − φE)∆ − (1 − δ)k]+s∆[α +( 1− α)(1 − φE)] (6.8)
πI(α,φ)=−(1 − α)k
πE(α,φ)=α∆ +( 1− α)δ[k +( 1+φI)(1 − φE)∆]
It is clear that there is a solution in which the entrants’ innovation φE and value VE
are stationary. To begin, we allow that the incumbent’s R&D and value functions may
depend on s: φ
s
I and V s
I . In this case, we can write the value equations as
V
s
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for s ≥ 1,a n d








− cE (φE). (6.10)
28Observe that the price of a long-term contract, which is paid when signed in period t,i sqt =
δ[k +( s + φI)(1 − φE)∆]. A continuing uncontested incumbent in period t sells to free consumers (for
ap r o ﬁto fαs∆) ,d e l i v e r so nc o n t r a c t sw r i t t e ni np e r i o dt−1, and writes new contracts for period t+1
delivery. An incumbent who faces new entry in period t only delivers on period t − 1 contracts. An
entrant in period t sells to free consumers (at a proﬁto fα∆), and writes new contracts for period t +1
deliveries.
29Note that with this change in the timing of payments, an increase in α that leaves more free consumers
can lower πE as deﬁned here.
34The incumbent’s equilibrium innovation rate satisﬁes
φ
s
I ∈ arg max
ψ∈[0,1]
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I are independent of s. Indeed, using (6.9) for s and s +1and
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1 − δ + δφE
¸
− cI(ψ), (6.12)
which implies that the incumbent’s innovation can indeed be independent of s.N o t e
that the direct eﬀect of antitrust policy on the incumbent innovation in this equilibrium
is determined by π0
m (α,φ).
We next solve for the entrants’ innovation beneﬁt function. Subtracting (6.10) from
(6.9) for s =1to solve for (V 1
I − VE), we can write the entrants’ innovation beneﬁt
function as

















πm − δ(cI − cE)




(suppressing arguments of functions). This parallels the case without incumbent invest-
ment except for the term multiplying πm, which now accounts for the possibility of rising
incumbent proﬁts over time (the diﬀerence vanishes when φI =0 ). The direct eﬀect of
α on φE can be seen by diﬀerentiating (6.13) with respect to α.T os u m m a r i z e :
Proposition 6.4. In the model of incumbent R&D to increase proﬁt ﬂows, the direct
35eﬀe c to ni n c u m b e n tR & Do fam o r ep r o t e c t i v ea n t i t r u s tp o l i c y( a ni n c r e a s ei nα)i s
positive (negative) if π0
m(α,φ) ≥ (≤)0for all α and all φ ∈ [0,1]
2, while the direct eﬀect
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2 .
For example, using (6.8) we see that in the long-term contracting model the direct
eﬀect on φI of an increase in α is always positive. On the other hand, the direct eﬀect
on φE may now be either positive or negative. When φI is close to zero, the direct eﬀect
is the same as absent incumbent innovation, and so is necessarily positive. However,
when φI is large, this conclusion can be reversed. Considering now the indirect eﬀects in
the long-term contracting model, we see that increases in φE necessarily lower incumbent
innovation, while increases in φI raise entrant innovation. Thus, when both direct eﬀects
are positive, we can be sure that φE increases when αrises; when instead the direct eﬀect
on entrant innovation is negative we can be sure that φI increases when α rises.
7. Other Types of Antitrust Policies
In the analysis up to this point we have considered policies that alter the proﬁts that
incumbents and entrants earn in competition with one another. Some antitrust policies
have other types of eﬀects. In this section, we brieﬂy consider two such examples.
7.1. Predatory activities
In some situations, antitrust may aﬀect not only an entrant’s proﬁts in competition with
the incumbent, but also the entrant’s probability of survival. To focus solely on this
eﬀect, take πI,πE, and πm as ﬁxed and suppose that a new entrant’s probability of
survival following its entry is λ(α), where λ(·) is increasing in α.
Now the innovation prize is
w =[ π
E + δλ(α)(VI − VE)]. (7.1)
36If (VI − VE)were ﬁxed, an increase in α would necessarily increase innovation. Now,
VI = πm + δVI + φ[πI − πm + δλ(α)(VE − VI)], (VI∗∗)
VE = δVE + u(φ)[πE + δλ(α)(VI − VE)] − c(φ). (VE∗∗)
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The fraction δλ(α)/[1 − δ + δλ(α)(φ + u(φ))] is increasing in α. Hence, provided that
(VI − VE) is positive, a more protective antitrust policy that raises the likelihood of
entrant survival necessarily increases the innovation beneﬁt.30 Propositions 3.1 and 3.2
then tell us that innovation increases with this change in α.
We illustrate these eﬀects with a simple model of predatory pricing:
7.1.1. Predatory Pricing
Consider a setting in which the entrant’s probability of survival after its ﬁrst production
period is an increasing continuous function λ(πE) of its ﬁrst-period proﬁt. (This could
be due to the entrant’s ﬁnancial constraints in an imperfect credit market, as in Bolton
and Scharfstein [1990].) In this situation, the incumbent will be willing to price below
c in the period following entry to increase the likelihood of forcing the entrant out of
the market. To see this, consider ﬁrst what the pricing equilibrium would be absent
any antitrust constraint. In any such equilibrium, the entrant still wins, and consumers
are indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms’ products: the incumbent charges price p and the
entrant charges price p + ∆. This is an equilibrium if and only if p satisﬁes
p ≤ c − [λ(p + ∆ − c) − λ(0)](VI − VE) ≤ p + ∆.
30For example, this will always be true whenever VE =0(say, because of a constant returns to scale
R&D technology) and πm and πI are non-negative.Another suﬃcient condition is φπI +( 1− φ)πm ≥
u(φ)πE for all φ.
37The ﬁrst inequality ensures that the incumbent prefers to lose at price p [rather than
undercutting the price by ε, losing money on the sale, but increasing his chances of
survival by λ(p +∆ − c) − λ(0)]. The second inequality ensures that the entrant prefers
to win at price p+∆. Assuming that VI −VE > 0, the middle expression is decreasing in
p. Note also that the second inequality holds whenever p ≥ c−∆ and the ﬁrst inequality
holds strictly at p = c− ∆. Thus, at the highest equilibrium price p∗ the ﬁrst inequality
binds, i.e.
p
∗ = c − [λ(p
∗ + ∆ − c) − λ(0)](VI − VE).
Note that p∗ ∈ (c − ∆,c). We focus on the equilibrium in which the incumbent charges
p∗, since this strategy for the incumbent weakly dominates charging any p<p ∗.
Now consider an antitrust policy that imposes a price ﬂoor α<con the incumbent.
Suppose that the ﬂoor is binding, i.e., p∗ <α .I nt h i sc a s e ,πE(α)=α+∆−c, πI(α)=0 ,
and πm(α)=∆:t h u s ,ah i g h e rα raises πE(α) upon entry, does not aﬀect πI(α) or πm(α),
and raises λ(α).I ft h ep o l i c yo n l yh a da ne ﬀect on πE but not on λ,t h e nb yP r o p o s i t i o n s
3.1 and 3.2 the policy would stimulate innovation. However, the policy also increases the
entrant’s probability of survival λ, which also increases innovation.31
As in the model of long-term contracts, an increase in α holding φ ﬁxed eliminates an
ineﬃciency, here the ineﬃcient loss of a new innovation. However, unlike the long-term
contracting model, we cannot conclude that an increase in α necessarily raises aggregate
welfare. To see one example in which welfare falls when α increases, suppose that the
probability of survival λ(·) is constant at λ around α + ∆ − c. Then a small increase
in αwill raise the price the entrant receives in his ﬁr s tp e r i o di nt h em a r k e t( a n dl o w e r
consumers’ payoﬀs in that period), have no eﬀect on an entrant’s survival probability, and
will raise the level of R&D. Because the ﬁrst eﬀect is a pure transfer, the overall eﬀect in
welfare will be determined simply by whether we have too much or too little R&D given
the survival rate λ, which can go either way just as in Section 3.1.32 By way of contrast,
if we instead have a perfectly inelastic innovation supply, α aﬀects aggregate welfare only
through an increased probability of the entrant’s survival, which unambiguously raises
welfare whenever λ(·) is strictly increasing.
31In a more general model with diﬀerentiated products, predation would make both the entrant and
incumbent lose money. Thus, increasing α would raise both ﬁrms’ proﬁts as well as the entrant’s
probability of survival, and so would again increase innovation.
32The reason we cannot use an argument like that leading to Proposition 4.2 is that the price increase
has a direct negative eﬀect on consumers plus the current incumbent; in contrast, in the long-term
contracting model, all direct eﬀects on the consumers plus the current incumbent were positive.
387.2. Shifting innovation supply
In some cases incumbents may take actions that instead aﬀect innovation supply. For ex-
ample, an incumbent may buy up needed R&D inputs, thereby raising potential entrants’
R&D costs. As another example, incumbents may engage in patent litigation claiming
that an entrant’s innovation infringes its own patent, raising the cost or lowering the
probability of the entrant receiving a patent. Formally, we now denote the innovation
supply correspondence by Φ(·,α). We say that an innovation supply correspondence
satisfying (IS1)-(IS3) is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in the policy parameter α if for
α00 >α 0 we have maxΦ(w,α0) ≥ (≤)maxΦ(w,α) and minΦ(w,α0) ≥ (≤)minΦ(w,α)
for all w. As the following propositions establish, increases in innovation supply lead
to increases in innovation in the same senses as before (we omit the proofs, which are
similar to those earlier):
Proposition 7.1. If the innovation supply correspondence Φ(·,α) satisﬁes (IS1)-(IS3)
and the innovation beneﬁt function W (φ,α) is continuous in φ, then the largest and
smallest equilibrium innovation rates exist, and both these rates are nondecreasing (non-
increasing) in α, the protectiveness of antitrust policy, if Φ(·,α) is nondecreasing (non-
increasing) in α for any φ ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 7.2. ??Suppose that the innovation supply correspondence Φ(·,α) satisﬁes
(IS1)-(IS3) and the innovation beneﬁt function W (φ,α) is continuous in φ. Suppose in





and that the IB curve crosses the IS curve from above on this interval.
Then φ(α) is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) if Φ(·,α) is nondecreasing (nonincreasing)





Thus, rightward (leftward) shifts of the innovation supply correspondence cause the
rate of innovation to increase (decrease) in every stable equilibrium. Returning to the
two examples mentioned above, these incumbent behaviors shift both innovation beneﬁt
and supply. If an uncontested incumbent over-buys needed R&D inputs at the end of
each period, this will both raise potential entrants’ R&D costs and lower πm.B o t he ﬀects
cause innovation to decrease. Patent litigation, on the other hand, will not only shift the
IS curve leftward but also lower both πI and πE. Again, both eﬀects lower the rate of
innovation.
398. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the eﬀects of antitrust policies in industries in which
innovation is central to competitive outcomes using models of continuing innovation
that are closely related to recent models in the growth theory literature. By using a
stylized model with reduced form proﬁt functions, and by characterizing the equilibrium
innovation rate in terms of innovation beneﬁt and innovation supply, we are able to
develop comparative static results that apply to a wide range of market settings and
antitrust policies.
In general, a tension arises in discerning the eﬀects of antitrust policy on innovation
in such settings. On the one hand, limiting incumbent behaviors that reduce the initial
proﬁt of entrants increases the incentives for R&D. But these same limitations will aﬀect
a successful entrant once it in turn becomes the next incumbent, and so could actually
reduce innovation incentives. Our results show how to disentangle these two eﬀects, and
we illustrate their implications for a number of antitrust policies. Interestingly, once one
looks at the eﬀects on entrant and incumbent proﬁts holding the rate of innovation ﬁxed
— as our comparative statics results instruct us to do — limitations on R&D-deterring
activities often involve no tension at all, as both entrant and incumbent proﬁts increase
holding the rate of innovation ﬁxed.
Finally, the tension between eﬀects on entrant and continuing incumbent proﬁts that
is our focus also arises in other settings, most notably intellectual property protection.
There, greater intellectual property protection has conﬂicting eﬀects on the incentives to
innovate: it reduces proﬁts for new innovators (who may produce infringing innovations)
but raises proﬁts for previous innovators. This is diﬀerent than the most tension most
usually discussed with regard to patent policy, which focuses instead on the welfare
tension between the (presumed) beneﬁt of creating greater ex ante R&D incentives and
the cost of greater ex post monopoly distortions. Rather, this tension aﬀects whether
greater protection in fact leads to a higher rate of innovation. This tension is at the heart
of recent work by Hunt [2004] and Llobet et al. [2000]. In Appendix C, we provide a brief
discussion of the connection between antitrust policy and leading breadth rules (novelty
requirements) for intellectual property protection in the context of an extension of our
long-term exclusive contracting model. While leading breadth rules are able to control
t h ee a s eo fe n t r yw i t h o u ts o m eo ft h ei n e ﬃciencies associated with activities such as long-
term exclsuive contracts, they require courts to determine the degree of improvement
brought by new innovations, which enfrocement of antitrust policy does not. The eﬀect
40on innovation incentives of the tension we identify for intellectual property protection
(and other policies), and the interactions between various policies that aﬀect the rate of
innovation, seems a fruitful area for further research.
Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 8.1 (A1). The model with N>1 entrants has a unique symmetric innovation
equilibrium, and the equilibrium innovation rate is a continuous nondecreasing function
of w.
Proof. The symmetric equilibrium R&D rates are ﬁxed points of correspondence σ(w,·) ≡
B (wr(·)),w h e r eB (a)=a r g m a x ψ0∈[0,1] [aψ
0 − γ (ψ
0)]. Note that B (a) is a nonempty
closed interval for each a (by convexity and continuity of γ (·)) ,a n da n ys e l e c t i o nf r o m
B (·) is nondecreasing (by the Monotone Selection Theorem of Milgrom and Shannon
[1994])). Therefore, σ(w,ψ)=[ σL (w,ψ),σ H (w,ψ)] 6= ∅,w i t hb o t hσL (w,ψ) and
σH (w,ψ) nondecreasing in w.




00,t h e nr(ψ
0) >r(ψ
00), and since
any selection from B (·) is nondecreasing we must have ψ
0 ≥ ψ
00 —contradiction. Thus,
σ(w,·) has a unique ﬁxed point, which we denote by Ψ(w).
Note that correspondence σ(·,·) has a closed graph, since B (·) has a closed graph
by the Maximum Theorem, and r(·) is a continuous function. This in turn implies that
σ(w,·) is “continuous but for upward jumps” as deﬁned by Milgrom and Roberts [1994]
(σL c a no n l yj u m pd o w n w a r da n dσH can only jump upward, no matter from which
direction we take ψ → ψ). Then Corollary 2 of Milgrom-Roberts applies to show that
Ψ(w) is nondecreasing in w.
Finally, the graph of Ψ(·) can be obtained by intersecting the graph of σ(·,·) in the
(ψ
0,w,ψ) space with the set described by ψ
0 = ψ a n dp r o j e c t i n gt h ei n t e r s e c t i o no nt h e
ﬁrst axis. Since closedness is preserved under intersection and projection, we see that
the graph of Ψ(·) is closed, and so Ψ(·) is a continuous function.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.We consider in turn the change in the payoﬀso fe n t r a n t s ,
the current incumbent, consumers, and the current incumbent plus consumers.
Potential Entrants: If φ increases then wmust have increased by (IS3). Using
(VE∗), we see that
(1 − δ)VE = u(φ)w − c(φ),
41which implies that a potential entrant’s value VE has weakly increased if the Value
Monotonicity Property holds.
Sum of Current Incumbent and Consumers: We ﬁrst compute a lower bound
on the value change of the current incumbent (the ﬁrm with the leading technology just
after stage τ.1). A policy change just after stage τ.1 changes the current incumbent’s
proﬁts only beginning in the next period. From equation (VI∗) we see that we can write
(1 − δ + δφ)VI =[ ( 1 − φ)πm + φπI]+δφVE (8.1)
=[ ( 1 − α)(1 − φ)∆ +( 1− φ)α∆]+δdVE
=( 1 − φ)∆ + δφVE.
Again, since VE has weakly increased, a lower bound on the change in the current in-
cumbent’s value VI starting at time τ +1i st h ec h a n g ei n
δ(1 − φ0)(1 − φ)∆
(1 − δ + δφ)
. (8.2)
Now consider the consumers. Consumer welfare does not change until period τ +1
either. Since every consumer is always indiﬀerent between signing an exclusive and being
free, we can derive consumer welfare from period τ +1on by assuming that all consumers












where vτ is the value of the quality of the leading good at the start of period τ.T h i s
establishes that consumers are better oﬀ,s i n c eφ increases. Now adding (8.2) and (8.3),
a lower bound on the change in the sum of consumer plus current incumbent payoﬀsi s
given by the change in
δ(1 − φ0)(1 − φ)∆




which is increasing in φ.
Current Incumbent: Finally, consider the current incumbent. Consider the sim-
plest model with two ﬁrms (one potential entrant). If VE =0 , which will be true if
42c(φ)=cφ for some c>0, then (8.1) implies that the incumbent is worse oﬀ since φ
increases. On the other hand, suppose that φ is ﬁxed at some φ (e.g., c(·) is ﬁnite only
at φ), then (8.1) implies that the incumbent is better oﬀ since VE increases.
Appendix B: Welfare Eﬀects in a Benchmark Quality Ladder
Model
Suppose that in each period t ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition to make sales. Thus,




∆(1 − δ)+δ[φ∆ +( 1− φ)∆ + c(φ)]





1 − δ + δ(φ + u(φ))
¸
. (8.4)
For now we need not be speciﬁc about the nature of innovation supply; we assume only
that it is described by a continuous nondecreasing innovation supply function.
Since we now have a fully-speciﬁed consumer side (unlike in Sections 2 and 3), we can
compare the equilibrium innovation rate to the symmetric innovation rate that maximizes
aggregate welfare.34 Let us begin by considering the social innovation beneﬁt. To this
end, observe that a technological advancement in period t raises gross consumer surplus
in every subsequent period by ∆. The social innovation prize ws is therefore equal to the





.F r o m ( V E ∗)w es e et h a tVE ≥ 0
implies u(φ)w −c(φ) ≥ 0. Substituting from this inequality for c(φ) in (8.4) implies that
w ≤
∆
1 − δ + δφ
.
33We focus here on the undominated equilibrium in which the incumbent (who makes no sales) charges
a price equal to cost and the entrant with technology jt +1charges a price of ∆.
34In general, the socially optimal innovation plan may be asymmetric. We focus here on the best
symmetric plan since our aim is to see how changes in the symmetric equilibrium innovation rate aﬀect
welfare.










Thus, w ≤ ∆
1−δ = ws, so that the (private) innovation beneﬁt curve always lies weakly
below the social innovation beneﬁt curve, as in Figure B.1. This diﬀerence is due to
the “Schumpeterian eﬀect” that arises because an innovator is eventually replaced even
though its innovation raises surplus forever.
Given the social beneﬁt ws (which is independent of φ), we can determine the so-
cially optimal symmetric innovation rate by constructing a social innovation supply curve
Φs(·)giving the socially optimal symmetric innovation rate for a given level of the social
innovation prize. Given the relation between the social and private innovation beneﬁt
shown in Figure B.1, it is immediate that if the social innovation supply curve coincides
with the private one then the equilibrium rate of innovation must be below the socially
optimal rate [note that (IS3) and the fact that wsis independent of φ implies a unique
44socially optimal innovation rate]. This is true, for example, when there is a single poten-
tial entrant (and, hence, a single research lab) and when there is free entry with a limited
idea.
In contrast, innovation may be excessive when there a ﬁxed number N>1 of potential
entrants. For example, consider the case where the patent is awarded randomly among
the ﬁrms who make a discovery and c(·) is diﬀerentiable. In this case, rN(ψ) takes
the value in footnote 7. Given an innovation prize w, the socially eﬃcient innovation
rate would obtain by letting each ﬁrm internalize its contribution to social surplus by
giving it the innovation prize only when it is the only successful innovator, leading to the
equilibrium condition ψ ∈ argmaxψ0∈(0,1) (1 − ψ)
N−1 ψ
0 − c(ψ
0). Comparing with (3.2),
we see that since rN(ψ) > (1 − ψ)N−1, the private innovation supply exceeds the social:
Φs(w) ≤ Φ(w), with strict inequality for all w>c 0(0). (Formally, the comparison follows
from applying Milgrom and Roberts’ [1994] Corollary 2 to compare the ﬁxed points of
the ﬁrms’ private and social best-response correspondences.) This diﬀerence is due to the
“business stealing eﬀect” that arises because a potential entrant is sure to get a patent
when all other ﬁrms have failed (in which case the innovation is socially useful), but also
gets the patent in some cases when another ﬁrm has succeeded (in which case it is not).35
As is evident in Figure B.1, these two diﬀerences make the comparison between the
equilibrium and socially optimal rates of innovation ambiguous when there are a ﬁxed
number N>1of potential entrants. As δ → 0 the social and private innovation prizes
both converge to ∆, and so only the latter innovation supply diﬀerence is present (pro-
vided that N>1). As Figure B.1 suggests (and Proposition 7.1 and 3.2 in Section 7
show formally), in this case any equilibrium innovation rate will exceed the socially op-
timal rate. At the other extreme, when δ → 1,w eh a v ews →∞while w ≤ ∆/φ.T h u s ,
as long as limφ→1 γ0(φ)=∞, the equilibrium innovation rate will be bounded below 1,
while the socially optimal innovation rate will converge to 1.
35In Aghion and Howitt [1992], two additional distortions are present: an “appropriability eﬀect” (an
incumbent monopolist captures less than his full incremental contribution to social surplus in a period)
and a “monopoly distortion” eﬀect (an incumbent produces less than the socially optimal quantity in
each period). These two distortions are absent here because of our assumption of homogeneous consumer
valuations and Bertrand competition.
45Appendix C: Uncertain Innovation Size and Selection Eﬀects
In this section, we consider an extension of the long-term contracting model in which in-
novations are random and innovators must incur costs to bring them to market quickly.
In such a setting, antitrust policy can aﬀect not only the rate of discovery, but also the
speeds with which diﬀerent types of innovations make it to market. Thus, antitrust policy
also involves “selection eﬀects.” Intuitively, some innovations may bring only small bene-
ﬁts to their innovators, but may create large costs for the incumbents they replace. This
may lead to circumstances in which more protective antitrust polices retard innovation.
To explore this possibility, we consider an extension of the long-term contracting
model in which a new innovator must pay K>0 to enter the market immediately. If he
does not incur this cost, he enters in the following period at no cost. We assume that the
distribution of innovation sizes ∆ is given by the cdf F(·)and for convenience we deﬁne
G(∆) ≡ 1 − F(∆).
To begin, observe that in this setting, if α is the share of free consumers, a new
innovator will enter immediately if and only if his innovation size ∆E satisﬁes α∆E ≥ K,
or equivalently, ∆E ≥ b ∆(K,α) ≡ K
α.
Consider now a consumer’s decision of whether to accept a contract from an incumbent
whose product’s value is vI and whose innovation size was ∆I, when the innovation rate is
φand the cut-oﬀ type for immediate entry is b ∆. If the consumer accepts he gets vI−qt+1,
while if he rejects he gets (vI − ∆I − c)+φG(b ∆)∆I. Hence, the incumbent will charge
qt+1 = c +[ 1− φG(b ∆)]∆I.
For given innovation sizes ∆E and ∆I we have the following proﬁts for an entrant and
incumbent respectively:























It is straightforward to see that condition (3.1) extends to the case of uncertain








1 − δ(1 − φ)
¸
≥ (≤)0, (8.6)
and the π functions are the expected proﬁt functions (the expectation is taken with
respect to the innovation size ∆). Taking expectations of (8.5), we get expected proﬁt
functions of
















Examining (8.7), it useful to think of a change in α as involving two eﬀects, a direct
eﬀect of the change in α holding the cut-oﬀ type b ∆ ﬁxed, and an indirect eﬀect of the
change in b ∆.
Consider the direct eﬀect. Just as in the basic long-term (exclusive) contracting
model of Section 4.1, the expected proﬁt of a continuing incumbent, φπI +( 1− φ)πm =
[1 − φ(1 − F(b ∆))]∆, is unaﬀected by a change in α holding b ∆ﬁxed. On the other hand,
the entrant’s expected proﬁt upon successful innovation, πE, continues to be increasing in
α, just as in the basic model, although here, this eﬀect also approaches zero as F(b ∆) → 1
since then nearly all entrants are in any case waiting for existing exclusive contracts to
lapse before entering.
Now consider the eﬀect of a decrease in the cut-oﬀ type b ∆.B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ,
this has no eﬀect on the expected proﬁt of a successful innovator, πE, since the marginal
type b ∆ who is entering is earning zero, but it reduces the expected proﬁt of a continuing
incumbent, [1 − φ(1 − F(b ∆))]∆, by speeding his replacement. Thus, in this model,
signing more customers to long-term contracts – an R&D deterring activity – raises an
incumbent’s proﬁt holding φ ﬁxed. So, in this model, the tension between the eﬀects of
antitrust policy on entrant and incumbent proﬁts is resent, even holding φ ﬁxed.
Whether an increase in α increases or decreases innovation depends on whether the
direct or indirect eﬀect dominates. Formally:
47Proposition 8.2 (C.1). In the long-term (exclusives) model with random innovation
size and costs of rapid implementation, restricting the use of long-term contracts increases











1 − δ + δs
¶
. (8.8)
For example, restricting the use of long-term contracts increases the rate of innovation
φ if f(b ∆) ≈ 0. In this case, the indirect eﬀect of a change in the cut-oﬀ type is of
negligible importance since there is almost no change in the likelihood of a successful
innovator entering immediately. On the other hand, it lowers the rate of innovation if
α>0, the support of ∆is bounded with f>f> 0 on this support, and F(b ∆) ≈ 1.
When F(b ∆) is close to 1, the direct eﬀect on πE approaches 0 and the indirect eﬀect
dominates, and so the innovation rate falls.
Of course, even when an increase in α c a u s e st h er a t eo fi n n o v a t i o nφto fall, successful
innovations are more likely to come into the market quickly, since the cut-oﬀ type b ∆
decreases. Thus, the welfare eﬀects of this change in innovation appear ambiguous. The
following example illustrates the eﬀect of changes in αon the rate of innovation and
welfare.
Example 8.3 (C.1). Suppose there is only one potential entrant and let c(φ)=cφ.
Then the innovation supply is Φ(w)=0if w<c , [0,1] if w = c,a n d1 if w>c .T h u s ,
for equilibria with interior innovation rates, we must have [using (IB∗)]
µ
πE(α)(1 − δ + δφ)+δ[(1 − φ)πm(α)+φπI(α)] + δcφ
1 − δ +2 δφ
¶
= c,







Figure 8.2: Figure C.1: c =0 .5











(α∆E − K)f(∆)d∆E +
µ
δ
1 − δ + δφ
¶



























This equation describes an interior equilibrium innovation rate φ. We now assume that
∆ ∼ U[0,1] and that α ∈ [K,1].W ea l s ol e tδ = .9 (a “period” is two years) and K =0 .3.
Letting φ
∗(α) denote the equilibrium value of φ given α, the solid lines in Figures C.1-C.3
graph the values of φ
∗(α) for c =0 .5,c=1 , and c =3 .
36Observe that the expression in curly brackets in the last line makes sense: the continuation payoﬀ
of an entrant starting in the period after entry is exactly equal to the present discounted social value of
the innovation less the present discounted social value of the ﬁrst innovation to follow it.







Figure 8.3: Figure C.2: c =1







Figure 8.4: Figure C.3: c =3
51To consider the welfare eﬀects of these changes, we consider as before an intervention
just after stage τ.1. Once again, all of the payoﬀ eﬀects of this change begin in period τ+1.
Observe, ﬁrst, that with a constant returns R&D technology, any interior equilibrium has
VE =0both before and after the change. So the only eﬀects are those on consumers and
the ﬁrm with the leading technology just after stage τ.1 (the relevant current incumbent).
When VE =0 , (2.1) implies that
VI =
"
1 − φ(1 − F(K
α))
1 − δ + δφ
#
∆I,
where ∆I is the size of this leading ﬁrm’s innovation. On the other hand, the continuation
payoﬀ of consumers starting in period τ +1is37
µ































where vI is the value of the incumbent’s product. Putting these together, discounted




















The dashed lines in Figures 4.1-4.3 graph aggregate welfare as a function of α for the
cases c =0 .5,c=1 , and c =1 .5. In each case, the optimal policy is either a ban on
long-term contracts (α =1 ) or unrestricted contracting (α =0 .3=K).T h e o p t i m u m
is unrestricted contracting when c =0 .5, and is no long-term contracting when c =1
or c =3 .( W h e n c =1 , unrestricted contracting maximizes innovation, but its ﬁrst-
period innovation-suppressing eﬀect tips the welfare comparison towards no long-term
contracting.)
37This can be calculated by observing that consumers start with a baseline net surplus of (vI −c−∆I)
in each period, gain ∆I from the ﬁrst subsequent innovation, and gain ∆ from each innovation thereafter.
528.1. Antitrust Policy and Intellectual Property Protection
The results for this model of random innovation size are related to those of Hunt [1994]’s
study of patent policy in a model of continuing innovation (see also O’Donohue et al
[1998]). In particular, Hunt shows that “leading patent breadth,” the requirement that
an innovation be at least a certain minimal amount better than the current leading
technology to get a patent, can increase the rate of innovation and aggregate welfare.
Here, a greater share of contractually-bound consumers shifts upward the cut-oﬀ level
of innovation that comes into the market rapidly, and so has an eﬀect very much like a
larger leading patent breadth.38
This similarity between the eﬀects of antitrust policy and patent policy raises the
question of how optimal antitrust policy should be aﬀected by the ability to also optimally
set patent policy. While a full analysis is beyond our scope here, some insight can be
gained by considering the introduction of a simple leading breadth policy into our model.
Imagine, then, that we can also set directly a cut-oﬀ level ∆C such that no innovation
of size less than ∆C can come into the market immediately. Suppose we start with an
antitrust policy α that is less than 1 and an equilibrium cut-oﬀ level equal to b ∆.I ti sc l e a r
that nothing is changed if we set ∆C = b ∆.H o w e v e r ,o n c ew eh a v ed o n et h i s ,w ec h a n g e
the eﬀects of raising α. In particular, now an increase in α no longer has any eﬀect on the
set of innovations being immediately implemented; only the “direct eﬀect” of an increase
in α on proﬁt levels remains, which we have seen causes innovation to increase. Moreover,
this increase in innovation without any change in the set of innovations being immediately
implemented necessarily raises welfare. Hence, the optimal antitrust policy when patent
policy is available sets α =1 . Intuitively, while allowing long-term contracts can be
used to prevent small innovations from coming to market, it does this only at the cost of
introducing an ineﬃciency. A leading breadth requirement in patent policy can achieve
38The structure of Hunt [2004]’s model is very simlar to ours. Greater leading breadth can raise the
rate of innovation because it can block innovations of small size that generate little proﬁt for an entrant
but destroy large proﬁt levels for an incumbent.
In contrast, O’Donohue et al [1998]’s model is quite diﬀerent. Their innovation process takes the form
of "free entry with a limited idea" but with innovation size varying instead of the cost of implementation.
In their model (where the rate of ideas is exogenous), increasing leading patent breadth necessarily
reduces the number of innovations that can enter the market without infringing an incumbent’s patent.
They assume, however, that infringing innovations can be licensed to the current incumbent, who then
implements them. Since increased breadth increases the length of time until the incumbent is displaced
by a noninfringing innovation, the incumbent is more willing to license infringing innovations the larger
is leading breadth. In the limit, as leading breadth grows inﬁnity large, the incumbent “owns the entire
quality ladder” and implements exactly the ﬁrst-best set of innovations.
53the same objective without this ineﬃciency. Thus, if innovation sizes are veriﬁable, it is
better to use patent policy. However, antitrust policy does not require that innovation
sizes be observable, and so may sometimes by the best way to achieve this end.39
References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt [1992], “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruc-
tion,” Econometrica (60), 323-52.
[2] Aghion, P. et al. [2001], “Competition, Imitation, and Growth with Step-by-Step
Innovation,” Review of Economic Studies (68), 467-92.
[3] Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein [1990], “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency
Problems in Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review (80), 93-106.
[4] Evans, D.S. and R. Schmalensee [2002], “Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust
Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries,” Chapter 1 in Jae, A.B., Lerner,
J., and Stern, S., eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy,V o l .2 ,C a m b r i d g e ,M A :
NBER and MIT Press.
[5] Fisher, Franklin M. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. [2000],“United States v. Microsoft:
An Economic Analysis” in Did Microsoft Harm Consumers?: Two Opposing Views,
Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
[6] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole [2000], “Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry,”
Journal of Industrial Economics (48), December, 373-90.
[7] Gilbert, R.J. and S.C. Sunshine [1995], “Incorporating Dynamic Eﬃciency Concerns
in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets,” Antitrust Law Journal (63),
569.
[8] Gilbert, R.J. and M.L.Katz [2001], “An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives (15), 25-44.
[9] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman [1991], “Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth,”
Review of Economic Studies (58), 43-61.
39A leading breadth policy could in principle also be implemented indirectly, by requiring an innovator
to pay a fee to gain access to the market, as in Llobet et al. [2000].
54[10] Hunt, R.M. [2004], "Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation," Journal of
Industrial Economics (52), 401-26.
[11] Lee, T. and L.L. Wilde [1980], “Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics (94), 429-36.
[12] Llobet, G., H. Hopenhayn, and M. Mitchell [2000], “Rewarding Sequential Innova-
tors: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts,” mimeo.
[13] Loury, G. [1979], “Market Structure and Innnovation,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics (93), 395-410.
[14] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts [1994], “Comparing Equilibria,” American Economic
Review (84), 441-59.
[15] Milgrom, P., and C. Shannon [1994], “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet-
rica (62), 157-80.
[16] O’Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer, and J.-F. Thisse [1998], “Patent Breadth, Patent
Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress,” Journal of Management and Strategy
(7),1-32.
[17] Reinganum, J. [1989], “The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and
Diﬀusion,” Chap. 14 in R. Willig and R. Schmalensee, eds., Handbook of Industrial
Organization Vol. I., Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[18] Segal, I. [1999], “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
114, 337-388.
[19] Stein, J. [1997], “Waves of Creative Destruction: Firm-Speciﬁc Learning-by-Doing
and the Dynamics of Innovation,” Review of Economic Studies (64), 265-88.
[20] Whinston, M.D. [2001], “Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We
Know and Don’t Know,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (15), 63-80.
55